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Abstract: The persistence of a dual self-identification expressed by citizens in the Spanish Comunidades 
Autónomas (nationalities and regions) is one of the main features of centre-periphery relations in 
democratic Spain. This 'dual identity' or 'compound nationality' incorporates -in variable proportions, 
individually or subjectively asserted- both state/national and ethnoterritorial identities with no apparent 
exclusion. It characterises the ambivalent and dynamic nature of spatial politics in decentralized Spain. A 
succinct review of the main developments in Spain's contemporary history is carried out in order to 
provide a background for the discussion of the various identities expressed by citizens in Catalonia. A 
segmentation analysis reviews the various forms of Catalan self-identification, among which ‘duality’ is to 
be underlined.  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Modernisation brought about the idea of all-embracing state national identities rooted 
in both cultural and civic axes. At the turn of the twentieth century, such identities are 
openly questioned and have become problematic. While being corroded by the 
forces of globalisation they are also subject to fragmentation, competition and 
overlapping elements of a multiple and diverse nature. Unquestionably, there is a 
noticeable strengthening of local, regional, national (sub-state) identities (Keating, 
1996). The discontinuity and dislocation of social arrangements provide that different 
identities relate to each other in quite an unpredictable manner (Giddens, 1991; 
McCrone, 1993; Melucci, 1989).  
 
Ethnoterritoriality refers to a conceptual dimension where conflicts and political 
mobilisations are developed and have as chief social actors those ethnic groups, 
which possess a geographical underpinning. Such a spatial reference is identifiable 
within the boundaries of a polity, usually of a compound or plural composition 
(Rudolph & Thompson, 1992). In plural societies individuals are tied to cultural 
reference groups which might be in competition among themselves. This results in a 
multiplicity of socio-political identities, dynamic and often shared, which are not 
expressed explicitly. Therefore, identity markers are malleable and the intensity of 
their manifestation greatly depends upon contingent circumstances (Barth, 1969, 
Brass, 1991, Cohen, 1992, Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983).  
 
For social scientists the main problem arises on establishing boundaries and 
degrees to citizens’ self-identification, and on interpreting those causes for political 
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 mobilisation related to territorial identities (Anderson, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990). In 
fact, identities are shared in various degrees by individuals and are subject to 
constant internalisation by group members (Greenfeld, 1992, Smith, 1991). 
Furthermore, supra-national levels of ascription (e.g. European) can integrate state 
and sub-state identities in apparent conflict among themselves1. 
 
The revival of ethnoterritorial political movements has coincided with an increasing 
challenge to the centralist model of the unitary state (Keating, 1988). In the case of 
Spain, as in other pluriethnic states, regional decentralisation and federalisation seek 
to articulate a response to the stimuli of the diversity or plurality of society, 
comprising cultural/ethnic groups with differences of language, history or traditions 
which can also be reflected in the party system. 
 
The persistence of a dual identity or compound nationality in Spain reveals the 
ambivalent nature of the internal ethnoterritorial relations that have existed in recent 
times. In line with cultural pluralist premises, the emphasis is not merely placed on 
the distinctiveness. Those relationships of interaction between the different 
ethnoterritorial groups within the state are also to be underlined. It has been argued 
that political accommodation to secure political and institutional stability in pluriethnic 
societies or polyarchies is almost impossible and is bound to result in either the 
break-up of the state or the consolidation of a type of hegemonic authoritarianism for 
the control of the state's unity (Dahl, 1971; Horowitz, 1985)2. On the contrary, 
ethnoterritorial co-operation and agreement may not only overcome conflicts and 
divergence within plural polities but can also provide a deepening of democracy by 
means of a more effective access of civil society to political decision-making. In the 
case of Spain, this development overlaps with its internal ethnoterritorial and cultural 
diversity. 
 
In the following section a succinct review and interpretation of some of the main 
developments in Spain's recent history will provide the reader with background for 
our subsequent discussion on the territorial identities in the Spanish Estado de las 
Autonomías ('State of Autonomies'). The last section of this article is focussed on the 
case of Catalonia. An analysis of data on citizens’ self-identification, collected 
monthly during the period 1990-95 (see Methodological Appendix), provides the 
bases for interpretations on the nature of compatibility between local/ethnoterritorial 
and state/national identities. 
 
UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN CONTEMPORARY SPAIN 
 
Spain's territorial unity has been put under strain by the centrifugal action of its 
ethnoterritorial and linguistic diversity, as well as by that of either weak state 
institutions or, sometimes, by violent central rule. Moreover, there has been a 
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 traditional lack of congruence between political and economic powers. This ‘non-
congruence’ has traditionally nourished the centrifugal tendencies present in modern 
Spanish history, tendencies that found expression in a number of armed conflicts. 
 
Centre and periphery in post-colonial Spain 
 
With the Restoration of the monarchy (1876-1923), and the centralising dictatorship 
of Primo de Rivera (1923-30) which followed, a new statistic attempt to impose 
uniformity on the country reared its head, but it ended in failure. 
 
A combination of disparity in Catalonia's social structures3 and impoverished rural 
Spain was an important cause, among others, of the rise of Catalan nationalism. In 
particular, the differences between Spain's two major cities, Madrid and Barcelona, 
became increasingly evident4. 
 
The Basque Nationalist Party, founded in 1895, underlined traditional community 
values in opposition to bourgeois industrial society, the effects of which included a 
considerable influx into the Basque country of migrants from the rest of Spain. 
Basque nativism of a racist character was the ideological basis of early Basque 
nationalism, which combined with powerful populist elements and religious 
exclusivism to produce a discourse quite distinct from that of Catalan nationalism. 
This latter ideology was more intellectual and has always been less secessionist in 
character. The reason behind its having provoked greater resistance than Basque 
nationalism ought perhaps to be sought in the fact that it offered an alternative view 
of Spain, something which Basque nationalism has frequently turned its back on. 
Both nationalisms, however, could be seen as political manifestations of a vigorous 
and prosperous periphery that contrasted with the centralism of the Spanish State to 
which it was subordinated. 
 
In other Spanish territories, regionalism came in different forms, in many cases 
stimulated by the action of the Catalan and Basque movements, and reflected the 
ethnoterritorial diversity of plural Spain. Partly as a consequence of the federal 
experience of the First Republic (1873), there were clamours for recognition in 
Galicia, Valencia, Andalusia, and Asturias. Chronologically, the appearance of 
explicit claims for regional autonomy in contemporary Spanish politics occurred in 
the years just before and just after the turn of the present century. 
 
The Second Republic, the Civil War, and the Franco dictatorship 
 
In spite of its short existence, the Second Republic (1931-9) contributed largely to 
the resolution of ethnoterritorial conflict. One of the most notable improvements was 
the constitutional design of state as a regional model, situated somewhere between 
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4 Between 1877 and 1920, the proportion of industrial workers in Madrid over the city's total working 
population grew considerably from 18.4 to 42.5%, but remained behind Barcelona (37.1% and 1877 
to 54% in 1920. Perhaps it is more significant to note that the proportion of ‘unproductive’ middle 
classes in Madrid, consisting of civil servants, members of the Armed Forces and domestic staff 
(23.6% in 1877 and 15.3% in 1920), was greater than that of Barcelona (5.9% in 1877 and 5% in 
1920). (Data taken from Linz, 1967: 209). 
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 a unitary and a federal state. This conceded statutes of autonomy to Catalonia5, the 
Basque Country6 and Galicia7. There is no doubt that the regional autonomy 
question also played a fundamental part in the political polarisation process before 
the Civil War (1936-9). Even within the republican forces the regionalist-centralist 
issue created innumerable controversies themselves. 
 
The autonomist process, though incipient, was spreading throughout Spain by the 
time the Civil War broke out. With the victory of General Franco's forces, a long 
period of political centralisation ensued, aiming once again to create a uniform Spain. 
 
Two of the most notable fixations of the Franco dictatorship (1939-75) were anti-
communism and anti-separatism. The ‘sacred unity of the homeland’ was regarded 
as an indispensable unifying element and raison d'être of General Franco's despotic 
regime. To a large extent, Francoism justified itself through its ability to suppress all 
forms of autonomism, regionalism and stateless nationalism. Any form of federalism 
or wish for home rule was understood by the Franco regime as ‘separatism’. 
 
The Francoist conception of national unity, at the expense of the cultural and ethnic 
variety of the people of Spain, degenerated into an obsessive dogma. In fact, the 
linguistic and cultural oppression of Francoism stimulated peripheral regionalism and 
nationalism in Spain (Giner, 1984). From the 1960s onward, the autonomist 
intensified owing much of its emergence to the nature of Francoism. During the final 
years of its existence, the opposition to the regime developed a compact programme 
for democratic rights and for the political decentralisation of the Spanish State. In the 
so-called ‘historical nationalities’ in particular (Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque 
Country), the forces opposed to Francoism were able to articulate a political 
discourse denouncing the absence of democracy and the continuous official attacks 
on their identities. In these communities, democratic and ethnoterritorial vindication 
went hand in hand. Thus, the ideology of autonomism and political decentralisation 
made its way into Spanish democratic political consciousness. 
 
The 1978 Constitution and the decentralisation of power 
 
After Franco's death in 1975, the transitional process to democracy began in 
earnest. The democratic parties did not have a clear-cut model for the type of 
decentralized state they broadly advocated. However, the majority wanted home rule 
for all the Spanish nationalities and regions. The constitutional expression of such a 
strong platform constituted a major political challenge, for Spanish modern history 
                                      
5 On April 14th 1931 the Spanish Second Republic was proclaimed. On the same day the Catalan 
nationalist leader, Francesc Macià, declared a Catalan Republic and the creation of an Iberian 
Confederation. After negotiations, the Generalitat was re-established. The Generalitat is Catalonia's 
government, of medieval origin.  
6 Three days after the proclamation of the Second Republic, an assembly of Basque mayors gathered 
by José Antonio Aguirre, leader of the Basque Nationalist Party, claimed their right to autonomy within 
a Spanish federal republic, by the historic Oak of Gernika. Nevertheless, parliamentary approval of 
the proposal was thornier than the Catalan statute. 
7 In Galicia, the Organización Regional Gallega Autónoma (O.R.G.A., Autonomous Regional 
Organisation of Galicia), led by Santiago Casares Quiroga, had instigated the drafting of a proposal 
for autonomy. On June 28th 1936, a referendum was held and around 70% of the Galician electorate 
voted. The final result was 991,476 votes for and 6,805 against. 
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 had witnessed tragic failures where ethnicity and the territorial sharing of power 
were concerned.  
 
The broad party political consensus which made the drawing up of the 1978 
Constitution possible, also brought with it an element of ambiguity in the formulation 
of the territorial organisation of the Spanish State. In fact, two different conceptions 
of Spain, which had traditionally confronted each other, were formulated. 
Subsequently, a middle way was negotiated and explicitly recognized by the 
Constitution: on the one hand, the idea of an indivisible and solely Spanish nation-
state, on the other, a concept of Spain as an ensemble of diverse peoples, historic 
nationalities and regions. 
 
The 1978 Spanish Constitution made it possible for the Autonomous Communities to 
be self-governing. It depended on the political will expressed by the inhabitants of 
each nationality or region, or by their political representatives. It also made it 
possible for the degree of self-government to be wide or restricted according to the 
wishes of the nationalities and regions. Conservatives, Centrists, Nationalists, 
Socialists and Communists hammered out an agreement of a type of ‘quasi’ or 
‘asymmetrical’ federalism with the implementation of the Estado de las Autonomías. 
The accepted solution took the form of an unwritten pledge to extend the procedures 
of political transaction and consociationalism into the future.  
 
This open model of ‘asymmetrical federalism’ did not presuppose the ways and 
means by which the different spatial entities could finally be articulated. Thus, an 
implicit desire was expressed by the ‘Fathers’ of the 1978 Constitution to provide the 
procedures and degrees of self-government to be pursued by the nationalities and 
regions while allowing them a high degree of flexibility8. The formulation of a clear 
division of powers based upon ‘orthodox’ federal techniques was, however, avoided. 
 
The construction of the Estado de las Autonomías had to follow a "top-down" process of 
decentralisation (Linz, 1989). This way of doing things is just one of the options 
available in the development of federal systems. The result at the close of the twentieth 
century is not much more than a series of practices of a federal nature involving a 
series of politically competitive units. Even so, the full development of multilateral 
decision-making, or a genuine common exercise of three-tier government action (at 
central, regional and local levels simultaneously), remains to be seen. 
 
The decentralisation process embodied in the 1978 Spanish Constitution has 
undergone a long period of consolidation. Support for autonomy, apart from the 
Basque and Catalan communities, has been particularly strong in Andalusia and 
other regions (the Canary Islands, Galicia and Valencia)9. Certainly it is the case that 
some regions were ‘encouraged’ by their most prominent political parties to enter 
into the autonomist process. Some areas with no self-governing tradition whatsoever 
                                      
8 The popular expression ‘coffee for all’ reflected this desire to avoid coercing the autonomist 
aspirations of other Spanish regions. 
9 After 15 years of deep political and administrative decentralisation, the judgement of the process 
made by the Spaniards was reflected in a survey poll according to the following percentages: 11% 
(“Totally positive”), 49% (“More positive than negative”), 21% (“More negative than positive”), 10% 
(“Totally negative”), and 9% (“Don’t Knows”) (El País, 19.11.95). 
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 were suddenly inspired to claim autonomic rights. These were mainly uni-provincial 
communities lacking ethnoterritorial specificity, unless they recognized their origins 
elsewhere, such as the cases of Cantabria, La Rioja, and even the province of 
Madrid. In some cases, the decentralisation process has entailed a break-off from 
the ethnoterritorial base of certain provinces. One of the consequences of this has 
been the creation of hybrids such as Castille-La Mancha or Castille and Leon. 
 
The cases of Navarre and the Catalan Countries (Països Catalans)10 have 
exemplified the difficulties in setting clear boundaries in certain regions. For some 
Basque nationalists, including ETA separatists, Navarre is an integral part of their 
country that can never be given up11. For most of the people of Navarre, however, 
the old kingdom has more than enough right to its own constitution. The Catalan 
Countries are perceived as a whole with a composite identity deserving political 
treatment as such by not just pan-Catalanist parties, but by the usually more 
cautious President of the Catalan Government, Jordi Pujol, in his federalist 
understanding of Spain12. 
 
In general terms, at the end of this century, it can be said that the decentralisation 
process has been assimilated by most Spaniards. This reality legitimates its political 
expression. However, although far from over, the decentralisation process needs to 
gradually adapt to new forms of inter-governmental relations, especially at the level 
of institutional collaboration13. The articulation of institutional relations involving 
shared powers and responsibilities lies at the very base of the federal-like 
ethnoterritorial relations of Spain. 
 
DUAL IDENTITY IN SPAIN 
 
Spain is a national state made up of nationalities and regions (Comunidades 
Autónomas). Both its ambivalent state-building and national-formation explain, to a 
considerable degree, the duality in which citizens identify themselves. This concept 
of dual identity --or compound nationality-- concerns the way citizens identify 
themselves in the Comunidades Autónomas (Autonomous Communities). It 
incorporates --in variable proportions, individually or subjectively asserted-- the 
local/ethnoterritorial self-ascribed identity and the state/national identity produced by 
political integration in the state-building process. As a result of this, citizens share 
their institutional loyalties at both levels of political legitimacy without any apparent 
                                      
10 Expression used by some to denote the Principate of Catalonia, the old Kingdom of Valencia, and 
the Balearic Islands. Frequently included is Rosselló (Roussillon), in southern France, where Catalan 
is spoken. 
11 This is the claim made by both Herri Batasuna, the political branch of ETA, and ETA itself. It is one 
of the five demands set by these radical separatists in order to negotiate with the Spanish state a 
permanent cease-fire. 
12 “In the specific case of Spain I could conceivably be a federalist, if the federation was based on 
genuine and authentic nationalities of the state, viz. Euskadi [Basque Country], Galicia, the whole of 
Castille, and the Catalan Countries (or just Catalonia, if Valencia and the Islands ... rejected being 
associated with the Principate)”. (J. Pujol, 1980: 26). 
13 According to 1990 data, most Spaniards were of the opinion that relations between autonomous 
governments and central government should be ‘collaborative’ (80.7%), and involving ‘shared 
responsibilities’ (50. (M. García Ferrando et al, 1994: 113). 
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 fracture between them (Moreno, 1986, 1988). 
 
The concept of dual identity provides a useful element for the understanding and 
assessment of political conflict and ethnoterritorial politics in contemporary Spain. It 
also provides a useful methodological tool for the measurement and interpretation of 
the degree of internal consent and dissent in decentralized Spain. Let us recall, as 
Juan Linz (1975: 423) has observed, that: 
 
“Spain today is a state for all Spaniards, a nation-state for a large part of the Spanish 
population, and only a state but not a nation for important minorities”. 
 
In general, the quest for self-government by stateless nations and regions is in full 
accordance with the variable manifestation of this duality: the more the primordial 
ethnoterritorial identity prevails upon modern state identity, the higher the demands 
for political autonomy. Conversely, the more characterized the state-national identity 
is, the less likely it would be for ethnoterritorial conflict to appear. In an extreme 
case, complete absence of one of the two elements of dual identity would lead to a 
socio-political fracture in the pluriethnic state, and demands for self-government 
would probably take the form of self-determination. In other words, when citizens in a 
sub-state community identify themselves in an exclusive manner, the institutional 
outcome of such antagonism will also tend to be exclusive. 
 
The task of identifying and measuring the notion of dual identity/compound 
nationality is far from simple. The changing nature implicit in such a duality 
complicates matters. Thus, positive perceptions on the action of the Spanish state by 
members of the Comunidades Autónomas can result in a loosening of their self-
ascribed local identity and a corresponding reinforcement of their sense of 
membership within the Spanish nation-state, and vice versa. Obviously, the dual 
identity concept modifies its constituent elements according to subjective perceptions 
and evaluations. In fact the reinforcement of one identity upon the other may well 
result in the complete disappearance of such a compound nationality as it now 
stands. 
 
The existence of this compound nationality in most of the Spanish Comunidades 
Autónomas had its institutional correlation in the setting-up of regional legislatures 
and governments in the 1980s, which have not only preserved local identities but 
have also projected the political aspirations of these sub-state communities. In the 
past the maintenance of regional ethnocultural peculiarities in Spain was the result, 
at least partially, of the inefficiency and weakness of the centralizing forces. Since 
the approval by popular referendum of the 1978 Constitution, such cultural diversity 
has been greatly encouraged by the governments of the Comunidades Autónomas 
which have given priority to cultural, educational, linguistic, and mass media policies 
(Giner & Moreno, 1990). The role of these self-governing institutions in the 
production and re-production of local identities is very important. Further, common 
elements of language and history in two or more Comunidades Autónomas make the 
task of interpreting the interplay of identities in boundary regions even more complex 
(e.g. Països Catalans referring to Catalonia, Balearic Islands and Valencia, or the 
cases of the Basque Country and Navarre). 
 
As 1978 Spanish Constitution recognizes, the Basque Country, Catalonia, and 
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 Galicia are three ‘historical nationalities’ within the Spanish State. They are seen, 
therefore, as minority stateless nations characterized by a ‘differential fact’ (hecho 
diferencial) or, in other words, as ‘distinct societies’. After 15 years of widespread 
political decentralisation, the political and spatial reorganisation brought about by the 
progressive consolidation of the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías is in line with a 
model of ‘multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence’ (Moreno, 1994, 1995). This model 
relates socio-political ethnoterritorial mobilisation to the competitive interplay among 
Spanish nationalities and regions pursuing political and economic power, as well as 
to the achieving legitimisation for their institutional development. 
 
In all seventeen Comunidades Autónomas there is a high proportion of citizens who 
claim some form of dual identity (see Methodological Appendix). As shown in Figure 
1, aggregate data in percentages concerning self-identification by Spaniards in the 
period October 1990-June 1995 indicate that a degree of duality has been expressed 
by around 70 per cent of the total (Categories (2): ‘More Andalusian, Basque, 
Catalan, Castillian, etc., than Spanish’; (3) ‘As much Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, 
Castillian, etc., as Spanish’; and (4) ‘More Spanish than Andalusian, Basque, 
Catalan, Castillian, etc’). However, differences are noticeable in some nationalities 
and regions (e.g. Navarre, Canary Islands, Asturias, and Galicia show higher 
percentages of dual identity). 
 
Approximately 30 per cent of all Spaniards have expressed a single identity with 
respect to either state/national or local/ethnoterritorial dimensions (‘Only Spanish’, or 
‘Only Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, Castillian, etc.’). The consistency in the results 
provided by CIRES periodical surveys is to be underlined (NB. The maximum 
deviation is a 4-point percentage). Although Figure 1 reproduces aggregated data, 
the same percentage consistency is observable on analysing results by regions.  
 
Figure 2 data reproduces data regarding all seventeen Comunidades Autónomas. 
Note that in the Basque Country and the Canary Islands single ethnoterritorial 
identity is higher than 20 per cent. Likewise, in Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, and 
Asturias single local self-identification is higher than 10 per cent of the total of survey 
respondents. Spanish single identity is more significant in Castille-La Mancha, 
Madrid, Cantabria, Valencia, and Castille-Leon (above 30 per cent in all cases).  
 
Shared identity in Spain as a whole is prevalent: (i.e. category 3: ‘As much 
Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, Castillian, etc. as Spanish’). In some Autonomous 
Communities percentages of shared identity reach over 75 per cent (La Rioja), or 50 
per cent (Andalusia, Extremadura, Navarre, and Aragon). 
 
‘Don’t Know/No answer’ figures are considerably low as compared to the usual 
percentages produced in this kind of surveys. This finding seems to confirm the lack 
of indifference among Spaniards on the cultural and institutional implications of self-
identification and the process of decentralisation. The only exception is the Basque 
Country (6 per cent) where the climate of political violence induced by ETA 
terrorism14 and the climate of civil confrontation could have had obvious impact in 
                                      
14 According to the ex-ETA member, Francisco Letamendía, in the period of democratisation in Spain 
after the death of Franco (1977-79), the terrorist organisation witnessed an increasing political 
isolationism in the Basque Country: “The degree of physical violence which the armed nucleus (of 
ETA) needed to develop in order to maintain the cohesion of the nationalist which legitimates it was 
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 this category. 
 
Some Comunidades Autónomas may be labelled as ‘exclusivist’ (Basque Country 
and Canary Islands), some more ‘localist’ (Navarre and Galicia), and some others as 
‘balanced’ (Catalonia and Asturias). By ‘exclusivist’ we refer to those Autonomous 
Communities with a level of single ethnoterritorial identity noticeably higher than the 
rest of the Comunidades. ‘Localist’ corresponds to a predominance of the 
combination of both single ethnoterritorial and local dual categories (i.e. categories 
(1) ‘Only Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, Castillian, etc.; and (2) ‘More Andalusian, 
Basque, Catalan, Castillian, ... than Spanish). ‘Balanced’ refers to those 
Comunidades where single ethnoterritorial and Spanish categories are on equal 
terms, alongside an important manifestation of ‘shared’ identities. The españolistas 
Communities include regions where Spanish single identity is predominant (Balearic 
Islands, both Castilles, Madrid, Cantabria, and Valencia). 
 
THE CATALAN CASE 
 
By the time general Franco died (1975), several unitary or cross-party organisations, 
which had been channelling the increasing popular pressure for the recovery of 
democracy and home rule, already existed in Catalonia15. The popular aspirations for 
home rule were widely expressed. In the campaign for the first General Elections 
held in Spain since February 1936, and which took place on June 15th, 1977, 13 out 
of the 20 electoral candidatures committed themselves to home rule. Note that 80 
per cent of the elected candidatures to the Congress of Deputies (Lower House), 
and all but one of the elected candidates for the Senate (Upper House) were 
committed to political autonomy for Catalonia.  
 
Solely the parties, which explicitly define themselves as such, cannot claim the label 
“national” or “nationalist”. Both PSC (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya, integrated 
within the Spanish PSOE) and PSUC (Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya, brother 
organisation of the Spanish Communist Party) have been not only Catalan national 
organisations but also main catalysers in the achievement of self-government in 
Catalonia. Note also that Catalan nationalists of the coalition CiU have steadily 
refused secessionism. Catalan nationalism has always attempted to influence 
Spanish politics and has repeatedly avoided limiting itself to mere local activities. 
 
As regards more specifically our discussion, the compatibility of identities in 
Catalonia is the most characteristic feature to be underlined. Thus, Catalonia can be 
labelled as a ‘balanced’ Comunidad Autónoma as shown in the following 
percentages for the aggregated data of the period 1990-95: (1) ‘Only Catalan, 12.5 
per cent; (2) ‘More Catalan than Spanish’, 18.9 per cent; (3) ‘As much Catalan as 
                                                                                                                     
much greater than that exerted during the era of Francoism” (1994: 261). 
15 The Assemblea de Catalunya, set up in 1971, genuinely reflected the struggles against both 
dictatorship and centralist rule. Its activities followed a simple four-point programme; (a) Universal 
political amnesty; (b) Basic democratic liberties; (d) Home rule, according to the provisions of the 
1932 Statute of Autonomy punt into effect during the II Spanish Republic; and (d) Co-ordination with 
the rest of the Spanish peoples to re-gain democracy. This Assembly of Catalonia gathered together 
trade unionists, Christian democrats, Social democrats, Socialists. Communists, Urban community 
associations, University groups, intellectuals and ordinary people in a clandestine and highly 
representative movement of opposition to Franco’s regime in Catalonia. 
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 Spanish’, 38.9 per cent; (4) ‘More Spanish than Catalan’, 9.8 per cent; (5) ‘Only 
Spanish’, 16.7 percent; (6) Don’t know/No answer, 3.1. (Figure 3 illustrates the 
evolution during 1990-95). 
 
As also happens in the Spanish context as a whole, data from the Catalan case 
shows a degree of consistency of the values produced in each of the self-
identification categories throughout the period under analysis. Slight annual 
variations are of little relevance. 
 
In order to make interpretations of the available data, we have considered advisable 
the use of a multivariate analysis. The independent variables, which have been taken 
into account by the CIRES surveys are: ‘Place of Birth’; ‘Education’; ‘Social Class’; 
‘Income’; ‘Economic Activity’; ‘Size of Town’; ‘Occupation’; ‘Ideology’; ‘Age’; and 
‘Religiosity’ (See Methodological Appendix). We are aware of the fact that these 
variables do not exhaust the possibilities for further research. In particular we believe 
that both place of birth of the parents of the surveyed respondents, and the 
competence in the use of the Catalan language are two important indicators to be 
taken into account in future studies16. However, the variables now considered offer a 
set of data that is relevant in order to carry out interpretations always subject to 
further contrast. 
 
We have carried out a segmentation analysis on the basis that it allows the 
construction of models where a considerable number of variables are taken into 
account. It also makes possible the setting of basic typologies with regard to the 
variable being used. The results of two segmentation analyses are presented in this 
article. Categories of identities have been grouped as follows: 
 
(a) Catalan identity (‘Only Catalan’ and’ More Catalan than Spanish); Spanish 
identity (‘Only Spanish’ and ‘More Spanish than Catalan’), and Shared identity (‘As 
much Catalan as Spanish’). 
 
(b) Exclusive identity (‘Only Spanish’ and* ‘Only Catalan’), and Dual Identity 
(‘More Catalan than Spanish’, ‘As much Catalan as Spanish’, and ‘More Spanish 
than Catalan’). 
 
Associations among different variables are worth exploring. However, in our 
analyses we concentrate in those with a higher degree of concomitance in the 
various levels of segmentation. These variables are reproduced in Tree-diagrams 1 
and 2. 
 
Analysis (a) 
 
After the examination of all data collected during the 1990-95 period the variable 
‘Place of birth’ appears to be the most relevant concerning Catalans’ self-
identification. Let us remember that since the beginning of the century, but mainly 
from the 1960s onwards, immigration from poorer regions of Spain has been very 
important in Catalonia. Between 1900 and 1950, three-quarters of all the 
                                      
16 Note that we have carried out our interpretations taking into account secondary data produced by 
CIRES during the 1990-95 period, and which do not include these two variables. 
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 demographic growth in Catalonia was due to immigration. In 1975, 38.3 per cent of 
Catalan residents had been born outside Catalonia. In the period 1941-1980, as 
many as 1,655,149 immigrants established in Catalonia. They were mostly job-
seekers, non-skilled and with low degrees of formal education, and came from other 
parts of Spain. At present, around a third of all legal residents in Catalonia are 
immigrants. However, it would be mistaken to speak of a homogeneous social group 
or category vis-à-vis native Catalans (Miguélez & Solé, 1987). This aspect seems to 
be confirmed by our analysis of the CIRES data.  
 
As Tree-diagram 1 shows almost 10 per cent of respondents born outside Catalonia 
expressed a ‘Catalan identity’ as compared to 41.2 per cent of those born in 
Catalonia. ‘Spanish identity’ was prevalent among 51 per cent of immigrants, by 
contrast of 15 per cent of respondents born in Catalonia. Note that the latter group 
also incorporates a high percentage of ‘shared identity’ (40.7 per cent). This feature 
can be interpreted as a reflection of certain traditions of political tolerance and social 
integration from the native population with regard to the immigrant population.  
 
In contrast with the often-uneasy relationships between native and immigrant sectors 
of population in other parts of Europe (e.g. Baviera, Flanders, Northern Italy), 
Catalonia offers an example of high social integration between both native and 
immigrants. Both collectives seem to be interwoven in various degrees and 
manifestations. Integration and tolerance are among the main features present in 
Catalonia’s social life. There is a widespread assumption that internal differences are 
articulated in a common project, and that syncretism is a constituent element of 
Catalonia’s national character. However, the evolution of identities of second and 
third generations of immigrants remains to be analyzed as an important element for 
future research. Some nationalists are of the opinion that those Catalans showing 
‘shared’ identities should opt in the future for a higher degree of local catalanidad: 
“Patriotic bigamy is not a good solution for the problems of survival of the stateless 
nations”17 
 
The second most relevant variable is ‘Education’. Note that while citizens born in 
Catalonia are over-represented in high educational levels, those born outside 
Catalonia concentrate primarily in low levels. A pattern shared by both immigrant and 
autochthonous collectives is that ‘Catalan identity’ increases with the level of 
education. The role played by the intelligentsia and other professional elites in the 
diffusion of national sentiments is a well-known sociological fact. Numerous studies 
have insisted in the importance of the educational system for the consolidation and 
reproduction of national consciousness. Likewise, population groups with better 
access to formal instruction are more inclined to “nationalistic” views in the context of 
minority nations within Western plural states. This feature is also applicable to the 
Spanish context. As regards Catalonia, the analysis of CIRES data corroborates 
previous findings along these lines. Let us emphasized that Catalan has been often 
considered to be a language of ‘culture’ which has traditionally conveyed the 
transmission of local idiosyncrasies. It comes as no surprise that those Catalans with 
higher degrees of formal education also show a greater disposition to ‘Catalan 
identity’. On the other hand, CIRES data also confirms that individuals with a low 
                                      
17 This was the opinion of Joaquim Triadú i Vila-Abadal, member of the Executive Committee of the 
nationalist party, Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (El País, 26.10.1996).  
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 level of education, the unskilled labour force, and the unemployed are more in line 
with ‘Spanish identity’ positions. 
 
With ageing a more perceived degree of ‘Catalan identity’ is also noticeable (in both 
immigrant and native cases, and correlates with the level of education). This 
association seems to validate the assumption that socialisation forces are main 
responsible for identity formation. Degrees of ‘shared identities’ are evenly 
represented in most sub-groups with the exception already mentioned about the 
higher degree expressed by the native population. 
 
Note that Catalanisme, or early Catalan nationalism, was mainly attributed to the 
political mobilisation of Catalonia’s bourgeoisie and middle classes during the 
second half of the nineteenth century (Solé-Tura, 1967). “Social Class” is, thus, a 
relevant variable to be taken into consideration in the case of Catalonia. This 
observation seems to be corroborated by the analysis of the CIRES data. An 
increase in the importance of ‘Catalan identity’ is noticeable on ascending in the 
social class structure. Two groups regarding the predominance of ‘Catalan identity’ 
within the autochthonous population can be identified: (a) Those with higher levels of 
education (and employed); and (b) Those upper-class groups with secondary 
education levels. These findings seem to underline the important role played by 
collective internalisation of historical events and by ideological traditions in the 
development of national identities. 
 
We can conclude that two are the main considerations that should be taken into 
account in order to explain trend changes in future Catalans’ self- identification: (a) 
generational differences related to educational tuition, and (b) differences in 
educational levels and social class.  
 
Analysis (b) 
 
Concerning ‘duality’ of self-identification by Catalans the main results are reproduced 
in Tree-diagram 2. 
 
Yet again, the first and foremost segmenting variable is that related to ‘Place of 
birth’. A reiterative pattern for citizens born in Catalonia to be more in line with ‘dual 
identities’ is apparent. Apart from this finding no other disparities are worth 
mentioning with respect to ‘duality’ as regards other variables. However, two 
peculiarities can be pointed out:  
 
(a) Less than 30 years-of-age immigrants with a low educational level represent the 
group with the least degree of ‘dual identity’, They tend to identify themselves 
exclusively: ‘Only Spanish’ or ‘Only Catalan’. Likewise, the degree of ‘duality’ also 
grows with ageing for those citizens born outside Catalonia. This indicator is 
consistent with the patterns of inclusion visible in Catalan society regarding 
immigration.  
 
(b) With relation to the native population, duality increases inversely from higher to 
lower social classes. In other words, better-off citizens (also, in many cases, with 
higher levels of formal education) tends to be less ‘dual’ and more Catalan in their 
self-identification (Note, however, that percentage differences are small). This seems 
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 to corroborate the importance of the Catalanist tradition in the contemporary 
manifestations of self-identification. 
 
As far as ‘dual identity’ is concerned the two most heterogeneous groups are: (1) 
Lower and lower-middle classes of native Catalans (75.5 per cent of whom identify 
themselves in the three dual categories); (2) The 18-30 age group of citizens born 
outside Catalonia (38.3 per cent of whom expressed a degree of ‘duality’). In this 
latter group processes of socialisation and integration have little or no effect. 
 
Self-identification and electoral behaviour 
 
How levels of ‘dual identity’ translate into electoral behaviour? The answer to this 
question cannot be univocal following our analysis of the CIRES data. In fact, we 
have not been able to make cross-tabulation between these two variables simply 
because the available data is lacking. The establishment of a direct correlation 
between self-identification and voting patterns cannot be deduced from the 
segmentation analyses we have dealt with in this article. We are convinced that the 
examination of these two variables would prove to provide fruitful explanations. 
Notwithstanding, and taking into account some partial findings of previous studies 
(Moreno & Arriba, 1996), a degree of ‘tactical voting’ by Catalans can be 
hypothesised and argued for. 
 
A view to Table 1, which includes the electoral results produced in Catalonia during 
1977-96, is very illustrating regarding this point. Note that a relatively small but 
significant sector of electors votes differently according to the nature of the election 
(local/municipal, Catalan Parliament, or Spanish Parliament). Note also that ‘duality’ 
reaches its highest ratios with respect to the ideology categories of ‘Centre’ (77.6 
and 65.6 per cent, respectively) and ‘Centre-Left (75.4 and 65.7 per cent, 
respectively). It seems more than plausible to consider the hypothesis that a number 
of voters, who self-ascribed themselves into the referred-to two ideological 
categories, vote to the centre-right nationalist coalition Convergència i Unió, in the 
Catalan Elections, while casting their votes for the centre-left Socialists in both 
local/municipal and Spanish Elections.  
 
Further research should substantiate these interpretations. Such studies are crucial 
for the purpose of distinguishing electoral sub-systems. In Spain, political colouring 
of local, regional and central institutions is increasingly dependent on the changing 
electoral support for parties operating at the various levels of government. Multiple 
identities seem to have a significant input in the way electors cast their votes. 
Undoubtedly, this ‘tactical voting’ will have far-reaching implications for the general 
governance in Spain and, in particular, with respect to the processes of policy 
making and implementation. The achievement of a culture of intergovernmental 
relations in the three-tier system of government in Spain appears to be one of the 
main political challenges in the next years to come.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As regards multiple identities in Spain, the consistency of the results provided by 
CIRES periodical surveys should be underlined. This pattern is also applicable on 
analysing results at the regional level. However, findings at the regional level show a 
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 degree of diversity in citizens’ self-identification. A common feature to all 
Comunidades Autónomas is the widespread manifestation of dual identities, and in 
particular those sharing both Spanish and local-ethnoterritorial at a similar degree. It 
should be also pointed out that less than a third of all Spaniards express a single or 
exclusive identity (‘Only Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, Castillian, etc.’, or ‘Only 
Spanish’). 
 
The case of Catalonia illustrates the comparability of both Catalan and dual 
categories. Furthermore, both segmentation analyses have confirmed some findings 
of previous studies (Serrano, 1995; Moreno & Arriba, 1996). The most relevant one 
is that self-identification by Catalans shows a considerable degree of duality. It is 
also important to point out that the variables ‘Place of birth’ and ‘Education’ are 
central to explain differences in the way Catalan identify themselves. There is also 
an observable trend indicating that as social class lowers so does it the number of 
citizens expressing a ‘Catalan identity’ 
 
On analysing multiple identities territorial and functional elements are intertwined in a 
very complex way. The changing nature of their interaction requires the carrying of 
further research on consistent bases so that new insights and plausible explanations 
can be proposed. 
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 METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 
 
 CIRES data 
 
 The Spanish Centre for Studies on Social Reality (Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Social, 
CIRES) provides research teams with data from national surveys. From October 1990 until June 1995, 46 
surveys have been carried out by CIRES on monthly bases (except for the summer months) covering 
several monographic questions. The monthly sample size is 1,200 adults aged 18 and over (N.B. The 
sample for June 1991 was 2,400). The survey poll is representative of the Spanish population over 18. 
Monthly samples are random and stratified by regions (Comunidades Autónomas) and municipalities 
according to size. 
 The periodical repetition of part of the questionnaire allows data aggregation for statistical 
purposes. In this way, larger samples can be obtained with a higher degree of reliability, and population 
areas such as Catalonia can be also analyzed. For the purposes of our paper, data from 46 survey polls 
have been aggregated resulting in a sample of 56,400 cases. The size of Catalan sample is 9,126 cases. 
 This paper analyzes the identity expressed by Catalan citizens based on the question addressed 
to them in the successive polls, which is reproduced as follows:  
 
Question: ‘In general, would you say that you feel.... 
1. Only Catalan’ 
2. More Catalan than Spanish’ 
3. As much Catalan as Spanish’ 
4. More Spanish than Catalan’ 
5. Only Spanish’ 
6. Don’t know’ 
7. No answer’ 
 For the purpose of our study, answers have been aggregated according to the following 
categories: 
 
a. Single Identity (values 1 and 5). 
 Dual Identity (values 2, 3 and 4). 
  (Values 6 and 7 have been aggregated). 
b. Catalan Identity (values 1 and 2). 
 Shared Identity (value 3). 
 Spanish Identity (values 4 and 5). 
  (Values 6 and 7 have been aggregated). 
 
 Segmentation analysis 
 
 Segmentation analysis is based on the chi-square research technique. It allows the selection of 
relevant variables and provides a description of the differences that diverse sample groups can manifest 
in a given category. 
 A number of independent variables are selected as predictors, along with the dependent variable 
subject of study. Population is divided into homogeneous groups and different from each other with 
respect to the dependent variable to be measured. Within a dependent variable, subjects are classified 
within groups with characteristics significantly different and based on the chi-squared statistical logic for 
the selection of the best available predictors (CHAID). This technique carries out the merging by 
categories of those independent variables with a similar profile in relation with the dependent variable. A 
first segmentation is carried out with the best predictor, and successive segmentations with the resulting 
groups follow. The test is continued only if resulting differences are statistically significant (Escobar, 1992).  
 The variables used as predictors in our segmentation research are: 
 
 -Place of birth (Born ‘In Catalonia’ or ‘Outside Catalonia’) 
 -Educational level (‘Lower’, ‘Middle’ or ‘Higher’). 
 -Social Class (‘Lower’, ‘Lower Middle Class’, ‘Middle Class’, ‘Upper Middle’ or ‘Upper’. 
This is a subjective indicator (self-perceived). 
 -Occupation (‘Non-active’, ‘Unemployed’ or ‘Occupied’). 
  -Age (Four categories: 18-30, 31-44, 45-64, 65 and over). 
  -Religiosity (‘No or little practice’, ‘Middle’, and ‘Active’) 
  -Size of the place of residence (‘Less than 5000’, ‘5001-50000’, ‘50001-250000’, and 
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 ‘250000 and over’) 
  -Sex 
  -Economic sector (‘Primary’. ‘Secondary’, and ‘Tertiary’) 
  -Ideology (‘Extreme Right’, ‘Right’, ‘Centre’, ‘Left’, and ‘Extreme Left’). 
  -Monthly income (‘Less than 75,000 PTAs.’, ‘Less than 150,000 PTAs.’, ‘Less than 
275,000ptas’, and ‘Less than 450,000 PTAs.’) 
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FIGURE 2 
Self-identification by Comunidad Autónoma (1990-1995)
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FIGURE 3 
Self-identification in Catalonia (1990-1995)
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BORN OUTSIDE CATALONIA 
9.92   /  35.26   /   51.0 
 
(N=2853) 
 
BORN IN CATALONIA 
41.26    /  40.67   /  15.15 
 
(N=6219) 
 
LOWER EDUCATIONAL 
LEVEL 
9.0   /   36.11  /   52.3 
 
(N=2188) 
 
MIDDLE 
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL
  11.7  /  31.88  /  50.69 
 
(N=436) 
 
HIGHER EDUCATIONAL 
LEVEL 
15.28  / 33.62  /  38.4  
 
(N=229) 
LOWER EDUCATIONAL 
LEVEL 
35.6  /  46.27  /  16.36 
 
(N=3019) 
MIDDLE EDUCATIONAL 
LEVEL 
44.2  /  36.2  /  15.8 
 
(N=2374) 
 
18-30 YEARS 
OF AGE 
5.3 / 18.8 / 67 
(N=94) 
 
31-44 YEARS 
OF AGE 
6.1/ 32.7/ 58.3 
(N=437) 
 
45 YEARS 
AND OVER 
9.9/ 38.0/ 49.9
(N=1657) 
 
18-44 YEARS 
26.1/ 49.0/ 22.6 
(N=1327) 
45 YEARS AND
OVER 
43.1 /44.0/ 11.4
(N=1629) 
NON-ACTIVE 
50.2/31.8/15.7 
(N=223) 
OCCUPIED 
55.7/31.5/6.4 
(N=561) 
LOWER & LOWER 
MIDDLE CLASS 
36.3/ 39.6/ 21.3 
(N=718) 
 
MIDDLE CLASS
47.1/ 36.1 / 13.4 
(N=1493) 
UPPER & UPPER
MIDDLE CLASS
52.7 / 22.7/ 14.1 
(N=163) 
UNEMPLOY
30.9/54.7/2.3
(N=42) 
HIGHER EDUCATIONAL 
LEVEL 
53.0  /  32.8  /  8.7 
 
(N=826) 
 
CATALAN IDENTITY/SHARED IDENTITY/SPANISH IDENTITY 
31.36                      38.87                       26.5 
 
(N=9126) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The rest of percentages up to 100% correspond to the responses ‘don’t know’ & ‘no answer’ 
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BORN OUTSIDE CATALONIA 
58.3 
 
(N=2853) 
 
BORN IN CATALONIA 
71.9 
 
(N=6219) 
 
LOWER EDUCATIONAL 
LEVEL 
59.19 
 
(N=2188) 
 
MIDDLE EDUCATIONAL 
LEVEL 
55.05 
 
(N=436)  
 
HIGUER EDUCATIONAL 
LEVEL 
57.21 
 
(N=229) 
 
LOWER & LOWER 
MIDDLE CLASS 
75.5 
(N=2458) 
 
 
MIDDLE CLASS 
 
70.19 
(N=3385) 
 
UPPER & UPPER 
MIDDLE CLASS 
66.8 
(N=259) 
 
 
18-30 YEARS 
OF AGE 
38.3 
(N=94) 
 
31-44 YEARS 
OF AGE 
53.3 
(N=437) 
 
45 YEARS 
AND OVER 
61.9 
(N=1657) 
 
LOWER EDUCATIONAL 
LEVEL 
71.95 
(N=1326) 
 
MIDDLE & HIGHER 
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL 
69.06 
(N=2059) 
 
 
DUAL IDENTITY 
67.5 
 
(N=9126) 
 
 
 
* The rest of percentages up to 100% correspond to the responses ‘don’t know’ & ‘no answer’ 
 
TABLE 1 
 
ELECTORAL RESULTS IN CATALONIA  
(Spanish, Catalan and Local elections) (1977-96) 
YEAR PSC-PSOE CiU IC/IU 
(PSUC)
ERC PP (AP) OTHERS
1977 
(SPANISH) 
28.4 16.8 18.2 4.5 3.5 28.6 
1979 
(LOCAL) 
26.6 18.6 20.2 3.8 1.3 29.5 
1979 
(SPANISH) 
29.2 16.1 17.0 4.1 3.6 30.0 
1980 
(CATALAN) 
22.3 27.6 18.6 8.8 2.3 20.4 
1982 
(SPANISH) 
45.1 22.2 4.6 4.0 14.4 9.7 
1983 
(LOCAL) 
41.9 23.1 13.5 2.6 8.8 10.1 
1984 
(CATALAN) 
30.0 46.6 5.5 4.4 7.7 5.8 
1986 
(SPANISH) 
41.0 32.0 3.9 2.7 11.4 9.0 
1987 
(LOCAL) 
36.9 32.6 10.2 2.4 5.6 12.3 
1988 
(CATALAN) 
29.9 46.0 7.8 4.1 5.3 6.9 
1989 
(SPANISH) 
35.3 32.5 7.3 2.7 10.6 11.6 
1991 
(LOCAL) 
37.0 33.8 9.4 7.1 6.2 6.5 
1992 
(CATALAN) 
27.5 46.2 6.5 8.0 6.0 5.8 
1993 
(SPANISH) 
34.8 31.8 7.5 5.1 17.0 3.8 
1995 
(CATALAN) 
24.8 41.0 9.7 9.5 13.1 1.9 
1995 
(LOCAL) 
32.9 30.0 11.9 6.3 12.2 6.7 
1996 
(SPANISH) 
39.3 29.6 7.7 4.2 17.9 1.3 
PSC-PSOE: Catalan Federation of Spanish Socialists 
CiU: Centre-right Catalan Nationalist coalition 
IC/IU/PSUC: Catalan Communists and Leftist coalition  
ERC: Centre-left Catalan separatist party 
PP/AP: Spanish Conservative Party 
SOURCE: Spanish Ministry of Interior 
 
